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THE BRITISH NEW GUINEA SYNDICATE 
AFFAIR OF 1898 
By 
[R. B. JOYCE, M.Litt (Cambridge), LL.B. (Sydney)] 
(23rd July 1953) 
Australian concern in the affairs of New Guinea 
before the declaration of the British Protectorate in 
1884 is well-known, especially such events as the pur-
ported annexation in 1883 for Queensland at the insti-
gation of Sir Thomas Mcllwraith.^ 
Less well known is the degree of Australian in-
terest after the annexation. In fact interest was much 
diminished for the achievement of British sovereignty 
meant the satisfaction of much of Australian concern. 
Thus the dominant need for security was felt to be 
largely satisfied by the existence of a British state, 
the early agitation against the German annexations in 
the north which had caused great outcry at the time 
had died down; traders were able to carry on their 
operations subject only to the restrictions introduced 
by the early administrators to protect the natives, 
now significantly subjects of Britain; there were the 
beginnings of an effective jurisdiction in the islands 
to replace the ineffective Western Pacific High Com-
mission jurisdiction based on distant Fiji; missionaries 
were not opposed to the more settled administration. 
This diminished interest after the high degree of 
concern between 1883 and 1888 is the first point that 
needs to be made, for the British New Guinea Syndi-
cate Affair cannot be understood without appreciating 
this early indifference shown to the new colony. The 
first ten years of British New Guinea are a history of 
reluctance by the Australian colonies and by Britain 
to invest in or to support the new colony, a period 
during which the Administrator Sir William Mac-
gregor was able to apply his theories of government 
of native peoples. 
Suddenly in May 1898 public interest was re-
directed to New Guinea after over ten years of little 
concern with its problems. The supposed granting of 
control of 250,000 acres of land in New Guinea (out of 
1. The major primary sources for this article a re : (1) British New Guinea, Original 
Correspondence to Colonial Office (Public Records Office, London) ; (2) British New 
Guinea Annual Reports and Minutes of Executive and Legislative Councils; (3) 
British Parliamentary Debates and Papers; (4) Queensland Parliamentary Debates 
and Papers; (5) London Missionary Society Records (Livingstone House, London). 
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58 million acres in the Possession) to a British com-
pany—the British New Guinea Syndicate—^resurrected 
all the attacks on Imperial unconcern with Australian 
aspirations and rights. Under the public sound and 
fury there were crises in the affairs of the island that 
needed immediate solution, but such a disturbed atmos-
phere was not conducive to logical considerations. The 
agreement between the three contributing Australian 
colonies—Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria 
—expired in 1898 and needed fresh consideration; the 
Administrator, Sir William Macgregor, was due to 
leave and needed replacing; the Colonial Office had 
recently made the debatable suggestion that the Solo-
mon Islands Protectorate should be added to the 
administrative area of British New Guinea. 
The British New Guinea Syndicate Affair then 
"caused a change in public interest in New Guinea; it 
came at a time when there were definite crises in the 
affairs of the young colony; it revived the perennial 
dispute between the mother country and her Austra-
lian colonies growing in responsibility. 
The public storm over the British New Guinea 
Syndicate scheme was brief, but it did serve to bring 
into prominence the current attitudes of all sections 
that were concerned in the island. It is these attitudes 
and their effect on the future of New Guinea that are 
significant, especially in regard to the always complex 
relationships between Britain, the Australian contri-
buting colonies and New Guinea. 
The facts of this British New Guinea Syndicate 
scheme, so far as they can be disentangled from the 
obscurities of political abuse, began with a plan con-
ceived in London in May 1897 (? inspired by the visit 
of one of the promoters to Australia in 1896) to 
develop the land of British New Guinea. The Syndicate 
submitted their plan to the Colonial Office who referred 
them to the Queensland ministers—Sir Hugh Nelson 
and T. J. Byrnes—then in London attending the 
Jubilee. A meeting in June between the Queensland 
ministers and the promoters of the Syndicate did en-
courage the Syndicate, but left any decision to the 
Lieutenant-Governor in New Guinea. Sir Hugh Nelson 
reported to the Colonial Office that he was personally 
favourably disposed to the idea of large-scale develop-
ment in general and to the British New Guinea Syndi-
cate in particular. 
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A representative of the British New Guinea Syn-
dicate went to Australia, met Macgregor, and Mac-
gregor in December approved of the scheme. However, 
at a meeting held in Melbourne in January 1898 be-
tween Macgregor and the premiers of the three con-
tributing colonies called to consider future adminis-
tration, no discussion of the scheme appears in the 
minutes of the meeting. This is significant because of 
later denials that the scheme was known to these pre-
miers, despite the evidence that these premiers were 
officially notified of the scheme by an earlier letter. 
. Meanwhile an Ordinance to permit the concession 
was being drafted in New Guinea and this was for-
warded to the legal department at Brisbane for com-
pletion. The Attorney-General (Byrnes) refused to 
assist in the drafting due to an earlier dispute about 
payment of expenses (£10/10/-) by the New Guinea 
Government, and the drafting was finished by a private 
lawyer. 
This Ordinance when returned to New Guinea was 
rapidly passed by the Legislative Council (21/3/1898) 
and forwarded to Queensland. This was the regular 
practice for British New Guinea was a British Crown 
Colony with a certain anomalous power of supervision 
given to the Queensland Governor-in-Council. Queens-
land approved the Ordinance, whereupon the Governor 
of Queensland cabled the fact of acceptance to the 
British New Guinea Syndicate representatives. 
After Queensland's approval the Ordinance was 
sent to the Colonial Office for Imperial sanction. The 
Colonial Office suggested certain minor amendments to 
New Guinea through Queensland, and to the Syndi-
cate. As the Syndicate agreed to these amendments 
the Colonial Office told them that they could proceed 
on the understanding that there would be no further 
reference to Queensland and the Syndicate paid their 
first £1,000 for the land. 
In April Victoria and New South Wales were for-
mally told of the Ordinance by Queensland. The first 
protests to the scheme appeared in the Victorian press 
and then the Premier of Victoria, Sir George Turner, 
complained on 19th May by telegram to Queensland 
against the scheme. The New South Wales Premier 
'^G. H. Reid) joined in the protest, and Byrnes (now 
Premier of Queensland) then requested the Colonial 
Office not to sanction the ordinance. 
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The Colonial Office refused this request, after 
which protests from the three colonies increased. 
Baron Lamington, the Governor of Queensland, sup-
ported ratification. At the same time the Syndicate, 
through its solicitors, urged completion of the scheme. 
Queensland protests to Britain were increased by 
opposition to the choice of G. R. Le Hunte as the new 
Lieutenant-Governor of British New Guinea. 
Byrnes died in October and following this pro-
tests decreased, but despite efforts of Macgregor in 
the various colonies there was no approval of the 
scheme. The Colonial Office insisted that the colonies 
settle the matter with the Syndicate, and not till there 
was agreement among the colonies to compensate the 
Syndicate to a certain extent did the Colonial Office 
disallow the Ordinance. New South Wales then refused 
to ratify this decision and prolonged final settlement. 
Such is a brief outline of the facts, an outline that 
tried to avoid controversial points and was therefore 
bald. In result it may seem that nothing had been 
achieved by this British New Guinea Syndicate 
scheme, no land had been granted, no changes made 
in the administration of British New Guinea. What 
then was its significance? A closer analysis of the 
motives behind the different actors, and the interpre-
tations they placed on their opponents* motives will 
reveal the complexities of the matter and lead to a 
realisation of its significance. 
Even the Syndicate would admit that it was specu-
lative in the sense of hoping to make profits from its 
scheme to produce rubber and other products from the 
quarter million acres it was demanding. But it had 
succeeded in convincing Macgregor of its genuine de-
sire to develop the island, of the soundness of its plans, 
and of the reality of its capital. It was given only a 
part concession; by the Ordinance it was to pay 2 / -
per acre for the land instead of the normal 2/6 an 
acre. Besides the initial price there were improvement 
conditions, in the first two years 6d. an acre, and in 
the next six years a further 6d. an acre. The Syndi-
cate raised only £5,000 of the £25,000 needed for the 
land according to its Memorandum. 
The Colonial Office was more suspicious than Mac-
gregor, both of its personnel and its motives, and the 
colonies regarded it with suspicion since it was British 
rather than Australian and spoke of a colonial office 
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plot to keep control of New Guinea for Britain. The 
Syndicate had been floated in England with three 
directors: Sir Somers Vine, previously the Assistant 
Secretary of the Imperial Institute; John Lowles, a 
member of the British Parliament, and C. M. Kennedy, 
late of the Commercial department of the British 
Foreign Office. According to Vine, the spokesman of 
the company, there were three supporting companies, 
the British Empire Finance Corporation Limited, the 
New Goldfields of British Columbia Limited and the 
European and Colonial Investment Syndicate Limited. 
Neither the promoters nor these supporting com-
panies inspired much confidence, particularly at the 
Colonial Office was there suspicion of their motives. 
Vine was suspected from some previous dealings, while 
the companies were regarded as merely speculative, 
and unlikely to be interested in the development of 
British New Guinea. There was Australian represen-
tation on the Syndicate, for instance two directors of 
the European and Colonial Investment Syndicate were 
W. H. Durrant, of an Australian firm of merchants, 
and Tilden Smith, a colliery engineer, the son-in-law 
of Gillies (M.P., N.S.W.). That the Syndicate was 
genuinely interested in the development of New Guinea 
resources is supported by their own references to the 
exceptionally large demand at the time for rubber in 
the manufacturing districts of England, particularly 
in the Midlands. 
In considering whether the Syndicate genuinely 
desi]v d to develop the island rather than intending to 
acquire the land for speculative purposes—it is suffi-
cient that some preparations were continued until the 
objections of the colonies were made clear, and after 
this their solicitors were ardent pleaders for their 
rights. It could be argued that they were not genuine 
since they eventually consented to take monetary com-
pensation rather than the alternative of a smaller area 
of land, though at this stage colonial policy was so 
strongly against them that their operations could well 
have been affected. Further, other companies were by 
that time interested, meaning a limitation of their 
possible field of activity. 
Generally the Syndicate's main interest is as the 
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instigating factor to illuminate the conflict between 
the other parties.^ 
Macgregor's position rests on his changed land 
policy which although not given much publicity had 
been mentioned in his recent annual report. No longer 
was New Guinea to be closed to settlement as in the 
early years, a policy that had been adopted to protect 
native rights, but settlers were invited and the next 
step, the encouragement of development by larger 
groups with the essential capital had been begun back 
in 1895. . . , . . 
Macgregor had from the first closed British New 
Guinea to large concessions and discouraged settlers, 
so ending the pending 1889 applications by explorers 
for large grants of land. This found support in London 
as expressed in a Colonial Office Minute (2/10/1889): 
"This win enable us finaUy to dispose of Messrs. Bal-
combe, Strachan, etc. (which included the explorer 
Theodore Bevan). The position advocated by Mac-
gregor that there is a welcome for the trader but not 
for the land speculator is thoroughly sound and Her 
Majesty's Government should express their concur-
rence."3 
The bases of this policy of exclusion adopted by 
Macgregor were, firstly, his consideration for the 
natives, based on his paternalistic interpretation of his 
task, an interpretation inherited from Arthur Gordon. 
He wished to protect the natives at least until "they 
may be in a position to understand what parting with 
their lands would mean to them." *^> Behind this desire 
was his caution—"better to make sure of the ground be-
fore proceeding to much legislation or to sweeping ad-
ministrative action," (^)—and his belief that, in any 
case, work by whites in the tropics was impossible— 
"the position of Europeans in the colony can, speaking 
generally, only be to supervise field labour performed 
by coloured men, and to work under shade or cover of 
some kind."^"^)* 
There were inconsistencies in his policy of exclu-
sion from the start—he had to recognise those already 
2. For Syndicate, see for instance: J. Lowles to Colonial Office 17/3/1897 (10585 C O 
Vol. 422/11) ; Somers Vine to Colonial Office 29/5/1898 (11598 C.O. Vol 422/13^ " 
Reid to Agent General N.S.W. 19/5/1898 (N.S.W. V. & P. 1898, Vol. 3 ) . 
3. J. Anderson on despatch Macgregor to Colonial Office 13/8/1889 (19444 C.O 422/5^ 
4. (a) British New Guinea Annual Report dated 18/11/1889. " 
(b) Memo by Macgregor 14/8/1888 in Musgrave to Colonial Office 27/8/1888 ir n 
^08/76). ' ^ • " • 
(c) British New Guinea Annual Report to 6/1891. 
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at work—then his policy was gradually evolved to-
wards allowing white development that was not incom-
patible with native rights. Thus the 1890 Crown Lands 
Ordinance provided the machinery for land alienation, 
and some land was granted after this. At the same 
time Macgregor was encouraging the development of 
native industries as an alternative to large-scale Euro-
pean development. Thus in November 1893 he intro-
duced a regulation to make it compulsory for certain 
natives to plant coconuts. He himself stressed the im-
poK T-e 0+' this measure, for "it has directly to do 
with the industrial, economic and commercial future 
of the native race . . . . if (they) do not become pro-
ducers on their own account, if they cannot greatly 
increase present exports and create new ones, they 
cannot exist long as a race . . . . in consequence of the 
gigantic strides that have been made in settling so 
many of these savage tribes, it is liable to be forgotten 
that a heavy task lay before the government five years 
ago to prepare any place whatever for the action of 
such a regulation . . . . it may be thought that this 
modest beginning could easily have been commenced 
long ago . . . . Much patience has however been re-
quired to clear the way even as far as this . . . . Clearly 
in the face of my views as to the future of the country 
such a Regulation should be introduced as soon as it 
is thought it can be enforced . . . . I believe that under 
wise perseverance with it the export of the produce of 
the coconut tree can be enormously increased here, and 
the position of the natives be greatly improved by the 
same means."^ 
There were then these aims to encourage native 
development on their own behalf, and to exclude white 
settlers, especially speculators. 
But the facts were that the colony did not live up 
to its vague reputation for wealth, it lacked Fiji's 
sugar and no such well-paying crop was found by Mac-
gregor despite various experiments. His land policy 
had not helped enterprises on a large scale which were 
needed for copra development. The combination of un-
favourable trade balances and scanty colonial contribu-
tions, with revenue always below his expectations, 
meant a failing colony by all contemporary standards 
whatever the long-term prospects of Macgregor's 
native policy suggested. 
5. MacTregor lo Norman 25/11/1893, in Norman to Colonial Office 26/3/1894 (7848 C O . 
422/9). 
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It was the logic of such figures that made Mac-
gregor revise his plans and gradually increase his en-
couragement of white settlers. Thus in July 1893 he 
hoped to find on the Gulf river land for sugar growing 
and so "induce one of the sugar companies" to start 
work there. By 1895 an energetic settler had shown 
that Europeans could do normal labour despite the 
climate, and had his efforts quoted to encourage fur-
ther settlers. By 1896 "the most discouraging element" 
in the Administration of the area was the fact that no 
European planting on a scale of any importance had 
been started, despite the apparent advantages of soil, 
climate and labour.^ 
But at the end of 1896 only 235 private claims, 
234 mission claims, and 37 Crown Land grants had 
been allocated. Much was owed to a few such as the 
important shipping and trading firms of Burns Philp 
which owned land in about twenty parts of the island, 
including a plantation of 1,280 acres, the largest in 
New Guinea at the time, and several trading stations 
about one acre in area. Of all the trading stations in 
the Possession Burns Philp owned a quarter. There 
were only about twenty holdings of more than fifty 
acres in area, and only 190 Crown grants up to 1897 
of an area of 6,570 acres, and of this small acreage 
only 2,600 were for pastoral and planting purposes.^ 
The eight years of sovereignty had not meant 
much European development of the colony, and it was 
on the basis of these facts that Macgregor changed 
his policy to support the granting of large concessions 
to a company. 
Even before the British New Guinea Syndicate 
Scheme was placed before Macgregor he had consid-
ered the development by companies which would have 
the capital lacked by his administration. Thus in 
England in 1895 he had an interview with "the head 
of a great firm established in Sydney," the negotiations 
dragged on to the end of 1897, but then ended in com-
plete faflure. Two other Sydney firms had been ap-
proached to one of which Macgregor had made re-
peated offers. In afl three cases the development of 
sugar plantations was the main object.^ 
6. See British New Guinea Annual Reports to 6/1893, 6/1895, 6/1896. 
7. Figures extracted from Executive Council minutes considering Land claims (C n 
436/1 and 3 ) . ^^*"-
8. See Annual Report to 6/1893 and Macgregor to Lamington 4/10/1898 in Laminptn« 
to the Colonial Office 14/10/1898 (26130 C.O. 422/12). 
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When the Syndicate's plans were put before Mac-
gregor he welcomed them and so told the Queensland 
Governor, for it would "give new and strong impetus 
to several economic industries and . . . . promote a 
large amount of employment of the natives of the 
colony in their own country."^ 
It does seem proved that the plans, now developed 
to the stage of drafting the necessary Ordinance, 
were not mentioned at the Melbourne conference in 
1898 to the premiers of New South Wales and Vic-
toria. Their nine years without the slightest interven-
tion in the colony's affairs was not enough to cause 
this reticence, for at this conference the general future 
of New Guinea was the major point and the Syndi-
cate's investment of £100,000 was as much as had been 
contributed by these colonies for the whole administra-
tion of New Guinea over a period of seven years. Mac-
gregor's comment that the three contributing colonies 
were the only opposition in his New Guinea councils, 
indicates his desire to control the affairs of New 
Guinea himself. Further he had begun negotiations 
with Sydney companies and would realise the possi-
bilities of opposition to a British company. Such con-
siderations could well lead him to keep the matter as 
secret as possible, knowing the independent spirit of 
the Australian colonies at this time.^^ 
On the other hand a reasonable defence can be 
made for Macgregor that the matter was one of 
notoriety in all the colonies concerned, and that there 
was Australian representation in the Syndicate. 
Firstly, Nelson claimed that the letter of 28th May 
1897 from the Colonial Office, which enclosed the full 
British New Guinea Syndicate Scheme as outlined by 
Vine, was sent by him to the Premiers of New South 
Wales and Victoria, who were Reid and Turner. 
Secondly, while in Australia after August 1897 the 
promoter of the scheme, Somers-Vine, claimed to have 
approached many public men, obtaining the support in 
New South Wales of politicians like Dibbs and Want, 
and in Victoria of Wynne and Gillies. Thirdly, Nelson 
had approved of the scheme on behalf of Queensland 
in December 1897. Given these points it is indeed hard 
to argue that there was no knowledge of the scheme 
9. Macgregor to Lamington 31/12/1897 in Lamington to the Colonial Office 5/3/1898 
(7836 C O . 422/12). 
10. For details Melbourne Conference see Lamington to the Colonial Office 18/6/1898 
(16595 C O . 422/12). 
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despite many statements to this effect made in 
Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria. 
Macgregor's sflence, if there was this knowledge, 
or if he thought that there was knowledge of the 
scheme, then would mean that he was merely follow-
ing the normal formal proceedings of only consultmg 
Queensland without any ulterior motives. 
Macgregor's most important attitude was his sup-
port of genuine schemes of development, for he was 
now convinced of the necessity for development on a 
larger scale than had been possible on the smafl 
amounts provided by the contributing colonies. Given 
this attitude, the faster the Ordinance was put into 
operation the better for the future of New Guinea. 
The Colonial Office was forced into the false posi-
tion of feeling obliged to support the Syndicate whose 
personnel they did not approve. When the Syndicate 
first applied to the Colonial Office its motives were 
doubted and the three promoters were suspected from 
previous dealings, but it was thought that such a 
scheme would "hasten the arrival of (the) self-govern-
ment stage."ii^*) 
Thus the Colonial Office referred to the lists of 
associations and individuals supporting the British 
New Guinea Syndicate Scheme as "a first class list of 
guinea pigs and company promoters,"" ^^ ) and thought 
that the aim of the promoters would be accomplished 
as soon as the promotion money was received. Their 
rather paradoxical attitude was summed up as "if this 
company is formed and does not cripple itself by heavy 
promotion payments it may do much for British New 
Guinea."ii («=> 
All that was done, however, was that a cautiously 
worded introduction was sent to the Queensland minis-
ters. Even after later detafls of the Syndicate and its 
supporters were obtained and had increased the 
Colonial Office suspicion no action was taken for it was 
felt that it was a question which Queensland and the 
Lieutenant-Governor should decide. 
After the scheme had been approved and the draft 
Ordinance had reached London, the Colonial Office was 
stfll uneasy, but only suggested a few amendments, 
which did limit the rights given to the Syndicate! 
11. (a) J. Anderson 20/5/1897 on Lowles to C.O. 17/5/1897 (10568 C.O. 422/11). (u\ 
J. Anderson 17/8/1897 on Lowles to C.O. 14/8/1897 (17772 C.O. 422/11) ; (c) J 
Wingfield 16/4/1898 on Lamington to C.O. 5/3/1898 (7836 C.O. 422/12). 
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Then came the attack of the colonies led by Queens-
land, and the Colonial Office was forced into its posi-
tion as devil's advocate. 
For the Colonial Office had doubts as to the 
motives of the Syndicate and their support certainly 
harmed the Syndicate's cause in the eyes of the 
Colonial governments. Their argument that faith 
should be kept with the Syndicate arose from the stan-
dards of the Colonial Office, it was felt that the Ordin-
ance, having been passed on the basis of a promise 
made to the Syndicate, should not be disallowed. The 
standards of the Colonial Office need to be stressed for 
they maintained this attitude despite advice from their 
Law Officers that the Syndicate had no valid claim in 
law, only a strong case in fairness and equity for the 
reimbursement of their actual expenses.^^ At the same 
time the reticence of the Colonial Office in not giving 
any hints to Macgregor or to the Colonies was unfor-
tunate, for it falsified their position in the eyes of all 
parties. 
The representative of Britain in Queensland, 
Governor Lamington, supported the expressed Colonial 
Office position from motives similar to those used by 
one of his predecessors, Governor Musgrave. Laming-
ton argued that British New Guinea should be made 
a Crown Colony independent of Australian <rontrol; be-
cause Australian control — particularly Queensland 
control—would mean the use of British New Guinea 
for black labour recruiting, it would mean the "aban-
donment of perhaps the most signal achievement in 
civflisation," generally he regarded Australian politics 
as being "too parochial and being conducted in the nar-
rowest party spirit" for Australia to control external 
territories, for such control would be "prejudicial to 
the interests of the natives and the development of the 
possession would be subordinated to that of Australia." 
Using these arguments he supported a grant to a 
British company in the hope that this would mean the 
continuation of British supervision.^^ 
Lamington's arguments influenced the Colonial 
Office only to the extent that they upheld the argu-
ment that Queensland should not have sole control. In 
the words of a Colonial Office clerk, "So long as 
12. Law Officers to the C.O, 29/9/1898 (7836 C.O. 422/12). 
13. In Secret Despatches to C.O. on 21/6/1898; 2/7/1898; 5/8/1898; 22/10/1898 (17291; 
17856; 20544; 20845; C.O. 422/12). 
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Queensland imports coloured labour for her plantations 
it would be impossible for us to hand over New Guinea 
to her alone." The Colonial Office position as to the 
future of New Guinea was that it was felt safe (and 
this word "safe" was used in London) to saddle a 
future federated Australia with the responsibility, 
especially as Bj-itain with her limited interests did not 
want to retain control—indeed at this time it was 
hoped that the new British Solomon Islands Protec-
torate would be taken over by the New Guinea Admin-
istration to lessen direct British responsibility. This 
suggestion did not cause any action, the Solomons re-
mained directly under the Colonial Office.^ * 
The last point of the Colonial Office position was 
its concern at the attacks of the Queensland premier, 
Byrnes, and his personal hostility was reciprocated, 
so detracting from the chances of any settlement. "It 
is time to give B. a hint that we are not going to follow 
in his wake and make ourselves a party to his shame-
less repudiation."*^ (*) 
Almost seriously opinion a t the Colonial Office in-
terpreted Byrne's personal hostility as arising from an 
incident in London when Byrnes was refused equal 
status with the Premier Nelson. Thus, Joseph Cham-
berlain, then Secretary of State for Colonies, said that 
"this is a serious business which we owe I suppose 
chiefly to Mr. B's. offended dignity in not being allowed 
to ride with the Jubilee procession."*^ <^ ) 
The Colonial Office eventually transferred all re-
sponsibflity for settling the matter to the colonies, 
pointing out that some compensation must be given. 
Their own opinions of the Syndicate were reinforced 
by the exorbitant demands made for compensation. 
Outside the Colonial Office there was little interest 
in the Syndicate in Britain, though some of the other 
British firms concerned in New Guinea could hope to 
gain concessions if the Syndicate scheme failed. Thus 
the Pacific Islands Company combined both English 
(Lord Stanmore—Arthur Gordon—was a director) and 
Australian (J. T. Arundel of the Pacific trading firm 
of John T. Arundel and Co.) interests, and had thp 
support of Macgregor; whfle the Liverpool Syndicate 
14. J. Anderson 4/8/1898 on Lamington to the C.O. 21/6/1898 (17291 C.O 400/, 
15. (a) J. Anderson 11/8/1898 (on 18045 C.O. 422/12); (b) J. C h a m b e r l a i ^ K T ^ • 
(on 21964 C.O. 422/13). ^S/s/iggg 
783 
representing Liverpool merchants seemed to have 
available finance. 
Consideration of the positions of the New South 
Wales and Victorian Governments, as the originators 
of the protests, reveals the origin of the opposition to 
the concession. For it was Australian rivals to the 
British firm that were behind this increased interest 
in New Guinea. The first public protests against the 
Ordinance came from the Victorian press, probably 
originated by Theodore Bevan, an explorer whose land 
claims had eventually been disallowed by Macgregor. 
Bevan's attitude to the natives made land grants to 
him by Macgregor unlikely, thus Bevan referred to "a 
few inferior coloured races, engaged in the sanguinary 
work of mutual extermination."^^'^' The press angle 
was to stress the British nature of the Syndicate as 
opposed to Australian influence, for example, an article 
was headed "A.N.G. Concession Favouring British 
Exploiters—An Amazing Monopoly."^ ^^ ^^ * Bevan's own 
case was weakened by the fact that Macgregor had 
previously written to him to try and gain his co-opera-
tion with the Syndicate. 
With the press agitation growing the Premier of 
Victoria, Sir George Turner, who three months before 
had stated that Victoria had no interest in New 
Guinea, became the first to protest to Queensland. 
New South Wales opposition probably gained 
strength from the trading interests of the various 
firms already working in New Guinea, for most of New 
Guinea trade came to Sydney. Further, Kennedy, a re-
presentative in Sydney of the Liverpool Syndicate, cer-
tainly helped the opposition.^ ^^* '^ 
But added to this interested opposition was a com-
bined Australian feeling against British control which 
made the political protests genuine. Therefore the 
three colonies could combine together, thus the Vic-
torian Premier asked the Queensland Premier to pre-
pare ''a full statement of the objections to the pro-
posals. The three premiers can sign it. Reid and my-
self can also protest on the ground that we were never 
consulted." 
This last ground of non-consultation, of which 
much was made, has little weight, for there had been 
16. (a) Article bv T. Bevan, Melhourne Age 21/5/1898, and Bevan. "Toil, Trouble and 
Discovery in British New Guinea,"" Lond. 1890; (I.) Melbourne V/rc 5/5/1898: d ) 
re Kennedy—see for instance Vine letter to C O . 16/7/1898 in Minct, Pering, Smith 
& Co. (Solicitors for British New Guinea Syndicate) to C O . (18048 C O . 1.22/12). 
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nine years of indifference about New Guinea by the 
Southern colonies, while Nelson reported that both 
Reid and Turner were sent the Colonial Office letter of 
the 28th May 1897, and that Turner sent comments 
on this letter. Further, after the Ordinance was sent 
south on the 19th Aprfl 1898, it was not for three 
weeks (17th May 18^8) that any protest was made. 
Therefore, though by the New Guinea Constitution 
matters other than "ordinary administration" were to 
be referred to the other (besides Queensland) contri-
buting colonies, this ground of non-consultation was 
only a quibble on which to base interested complaints.*^ 
At the same time the southern colonies were 
against supplying more money for the colony. Reid 
argued in favour of Britain taking over New Guinea 
as a Crown Colony, but apparently wanted actual Aus-
tralian control with Britain supplying the finance. 
Turner had been willing to assist only because the 
other colonies were contributing "hoping in the mean-
time (that) federation wifl take place, and the whole 
thing wfll be thrown on the federation." This argu-
ment is not one based on the theoretical superiority in 
regard to external affairs of one unified Australian 
Government over six discordant colonial Parliaments, 
but one reflecting the practical financial difficulties 
facing Colonial Premiers in trying to pass votes for 
external affairs by cutting down estimates for internal 
matters. As Turner reported, the annual budget votes 
in Victoria led to debates between providing finance 
for New Guinea or for "roads and bridges" in the 
colony. It reflects more the disinterest of these colonial 
governments in external matters, a disinterest that is 
more typical than the burst of interest caused by this 
Syndicate affair.*^ 
Finally, there was Queensland's part in the affair, 
more complicated because of greater interest and con-
flicting opinions. After 1888 and the declaration of 
sovereignty. New Guinea affairs were not of political 
moment in Queensland and there were only occasional 
references in debates and questions. Two statements 
in 1890 and 1892 denying the use of New Guinea as a 
potential field for labour recruiting; one reference in 
1891 to the strategical danger of German New Guinea; 
and an 1895 question suggesting fears of New Guinea 
17. See correspondence printed in N.S.W. V. & P. 1898 Vol. 3. 
18. Opinions from Melbourne Conference (See Footnote 10 supra) . 
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competition in sugar growing—^these are the infre-
quent notifications that Queensland was primarily con-
cerned in the control of the colony. Even in 1897 
when the Governor's speech announced the end of the 
ten-year agreement there was no ensuing debate, only 
praise of Macgregor, itself significant enough in sug-
gesting satisfaction with his policy.*^ But, on the other 
hand, all New Guinea questions were handled by the 
Governor of Queensland with the advice of his Council, 
and constant aid was given to the administration by 
the various governmental departmients. In practice, 
Council concern was limited and restricted to one man, 
the Chief Secretary, for no British New Guinea pro-
blem seems to have been discussed by the Council as a 
whole in these ten years. Thus Byrnes could say that 
he "never heard discussed . . . . the administration of 
New Guinea . . . . in Cabinet. Sir Hugh Nelson, as 
Chief Secretary, had the matter in his hands for 
years."2o 
It was then a matter of the attitude of individuals, 
firstly that of Nelson, who as Chief Secretary since 
1893 had an unrivalled knowledge of policy in New 
Guinea. His favourable view of the Syndicate scheme 
was much of a recommendation, close to a sign of 
approval by Queensland even if it was made subject 
to Macgregor's opinion. In December 1897 Nelson "on 
behalf of the Queensland government" saw no objec-
tion to approval of the scheme and gave his formal 
approval to the Governor of Queensland and this 
opinion was reinforced by his visit to New Guinea in 
April and May 1898. After this trip he reported his 
support of large-scale development plans, arguing that 
this was the only way development was possible. In 
his opinion of June 1898, he faced many of the argu-
ments later used against the scheme. "Without wish-
ing to draw unfavourable comparisons, I may state 
that no land came under my observation suitable for 
settlement in small areas (nor can any of them, in my 
opinion, compare with the lands on the Herbert, the 
Johnstone, the Daintree, and other rivers in tropical 
Queensland). The conditions of climate and other cir-
cumstances connected with the possession are such, as 
to lead me to form the decided opinion that none of 
the lands there are suitable for small settlers with 
19. From Q.L.A. Debates 1888-1898. 
20. From J. Byrnes speech in Q.L.A.. (pp. 83-88, Vol. 79, Debate 26/7/1898—17/8/1898). 
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limited means, or for what we cafl 'close settlement.' 
If the country is to be developed, it can be accom-
plished only by companies or individuals having com-
mand of large amounts of capital. Nothing came under 
my observation that would lead me to believe that the 
inducements to settle on the territory are sufficiently 
strong to attract farmers or others from Queensland 
or the other Australian colonies." 
With these opinions formed partly from his brief 
visit to New Guinea but more significantly influenced 
by Macgregor's support of the scheme, he backed the 
Syndicate and further attacked the point of monopoly 
by stressing the relatively tiny area asked for (quarter 
of a million out of 58 million acres—^but note the 
danger of such figures because much land is useless 
and much was in unsettled areas, even Macgregor said 
that it would take a year to prepare 100,000 acres) 
and stating that he was convinced that "the advan-
tages that will accrue from the expenditure of capital 
and the development of trade will be more in favour 
of the Possession and of the Australian Colonies than 
of the Syndicate who will necessarily have to take all 
the risks and expenses of pioneering, and can hardly 
expect to derive any profits from their undertaking for 
some years to come." 
Nelson's reticence at the Melbourne conference is 
open to the same considerations as Macgregor's 
actions. Nelson's own defence was that the conference 
only concerned the future financing of the colony, and 
that the matter was one of notoriety. Nelson left office 
in April before the complaints came from Southern 
Colonies, and as his successor as Premier, Byrnes, be-
came the sternest critic of the scheme there was no 
question of disagreement between Queensland and the 
Southern colonies.^* 
Byrnes, an impetuous young Irish lawyer, felt that 
he was fighting for Queensland development and 
Queensland's rights as against Britain. Originafly a 
member for a northern constituency he repeatedly de-
nounced the Syndicate as setting up future competi-
tion with the sugar planters of North Queensland, be-
sides the suspicion that he wished to use the New 
Guinea natives to supplement the supply of black lab-
our from the Solomons. He persisted in this attack 
21. For Nelson's position see his statement in Lamington to the C.O. 1 & 2/7/1000 
(17810, 17811 C.O. 422/12). / '/A»98 
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despite the Syndicate's denial that they had ever in-
tended to start sugar plantations. In the same way 
Byrnes attacked the granting to the Syndicate .of full 
mineral rights in the land, arguing that this would 
prevent enterprise by individuals. This was an argu-
ment which sought and found support in Queensland 
mining constituencies. It had little true validity in 
New Guinea, since the potential mining areas of the 
island had certainly not been thoroughly exploited be-
fore this nor would this granting of a quarter of a 
miflion acres prevent prospecting. The argument 
against the principle of a grant of a monopoly, though 
made much of, was not sincere. Had the company 
been an Australian company nothing would have been 
heard of such an objection. Indeed the Syndicate's re-
presentatives did suggest that Byrnes was himself 
interested in a rival company's scheme. 
The argument against a British monopoly is more 
in point, and leads on from this point of Byrnes' de-
fence of Queensland development to his defence of 
Queensland rights and his personal rights which 
were as important to this brilliant enfant terrible. 
For Byrnes, if he did object at the first meeting 
in London in June 1897, did so but mildly, and if he did 
not hear of the scheme from then on until his belated 
protests in May 1898, he was surprisingly disinterested 
in what he later described as such a terrible denuncia-
tion of Queensland's rights. His story of lack of know-
ledge is weak. We are asked to swallow two rather tall 
stories, to account for his initials on the draft Ordin-
ance and on the Despatch sending the Ordinance to 
the Southern colonies, neither of which, I think, could 
support a legal plea of "Non est factum." 
The first story is that on 20th January, when the 
draft Ordinance sent from New Guinea to the Queens-
land Legal Department — he was then Attorney-
General—came before him, he did not read the Ordin-
ance nor even look at its title. His story is that because 
of a previous dispute, when New Guinea refused to pay 
for legal drafting, he at once referred the papers back 
to New Guinea. 
The second story is that on 19th April, in his 
capacity as Chief Secretary, he forwarded the Ordin-
ance for the information of the governments of N.S.W. 
and Victoria in a purely departmental way, just sign-
ing his name to it and sending it along, without being 
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aware whether the matter had been referred south be-
fore, and more important, without making any protest 
at its subject matter later so attacked. 
Even if these are justified, if he was even worried 
about the possibility of such land grants, he could have 
easily inquired from his chief, and further he must 
have known that the representative of the Syndicate 
was in Australia. 
I think it is clear that he took an opportunity of 
making political capital against Britain, at the same 
time hoping to enhance both Queensland's and his own 
reputation. The result was troublesome to New Guinea, 
Britain and Queensland, and only the death of Byrnes 
ended the dilemma. His lone objection to the sug-
gest*>d new Lieutenant-Governor, Le Hunte, was part 
of his assertion of the rights of Queensland against 
the Colonial Office. In fact, Macgregor was responsible 
for the suggestion, and the proposal had been submit-
ted to Queensland and then to the other southern 
colonies. Chamberlain's theory that all his opposition 
sprang from an imagined personal affront in London 
has the merit of stressing his pride, both in himself 
and in Queensland, which he was fighting to uphold.22 
The affair was before the Queensland Legislature 
throughout the Address-in-Reply Debate which lasted 
for over three weeks, and this debate brought forth 
some thirty theories, many only precariously attached 
to the facts. The centre of the debate was Byrnes' 
long defence of his actions, and most of the speakers 
concentrated on attacking or defending him, and 
searching for alternative scapegoats. The favourite 
candidates were Chamberlain ("up to his neck in it" 
declared McDonald, a Labour member) ; Nelson ("the 
most guilty party," argued another Labour member, 
Jackson) ; and Macgregor.23 
In this debate any idea that there were natives 
m New Guinea could only be gathered incidentally. 
The pioneer London Missionary Society representative. 
Rev. William Lawes, had already made the same objec-
tion to the Ordinance, "the natives are not referred 
22. See (1) Byrnes speech in Q.L.A. (supra Footnote 20) ; (2) Byrnes to Laminjrton 
letters in Vol. 27, 1898 of Qld. Official Letters to the Governor (Uni. of Q]d f ih 
r a ry ) ; (3) Lamington to C O . 2/7/1898 (17856 C O . 422/12) ; (4) Chamborl»^^ 
25/8/1898 (Footnote 15 supra). - "'^"'I'^rlain 
23. For Address-in-Reply Debate see Q.L.A. Debates Vol. 79 (Footnote 20 supra*. 
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to . . . . except once in reference to land . . . . it might 
have been uninhabited land."^* 
Thus in this Queensland debate, Turley, the Lab-
our member for Brisbane South, quoted a speech by 
Byrnes in the North, fearing that the Syndicate would 
monopolise the black labour that could be used in 
Queensland. Irreconcilable with such a fear was the 
suspicion by other members that such a syndicate 
would need to introduce alien labour into New Guinea. 
Thus C. H. Buzacott, of the Legislative Council, feared 
that this would fill New Guinea "with Japanese, 
Chinese, and all those other choice Asiatic races who 
are so ready to bear down upon us and overtake us all." 
Future development as a colony, and as a paying 
colony, able to support itself, was more important to 
Queensland politicians than the future of the natives 
of New Guinea. Here there were fears expressed of 
possible comjpetition with Queensland, either with her 
sugar markets or by using money better spent on inter-
nal expansion (for example by Dunsford, the Labour 
member for Charters Towers). At its extreme this 
argument regretted all expense on New Guinea. "The 
£30,000 we have spent in there during the last ten 
years would have been far better spent in running rail-
ways into different parts of North Queensland," 
claimed W. Smyth, the Liberal niember for Gympie. 
Similarly opposition arose from comparing the restric-
tions of the Queensland Land and Mining Laws and 
the apparent liberality of the grants to the Syndicate. 
But condemnation of the Syndicate was by no 
means unanimous and arguments criticising its mono-
polistic character were contradicted by those suggest-
ing that if it had been an Australian company there 
would have been few suggestions. The unlikelihood of 
such a company was, however, suggested by speakers 
who pointed out the previous lack of interest by Aus-
tralian capitalists and settlers. 
Besides Byrnes' plea for the control of Australian 
affairs by Australians in fulfilment of responsible gov-
ernment, little attention was given to future control 
of the island, though most of the speakers in the de-
bate implied that Queensland should maintain her 
interests. 
24. Law(^s to Foreign Secretary, London Missionary Society 13/5/1898 (Letters in Living-
stone House, London). 
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Two cabinet ministers were more directly con-
cerned, firstly J. F. E. Foxton, the Secrteary for Public 
Lands, who argued for fuH control by Australia, stress-
ing that the incident should mean the end of the 
absurd existing system of divided control. J. R. Dick-
son, the Home Secretary, on the other hand, hinted at 
the continuance of Imperial control, doubting how far 
Queensland could "administer New Guinea in the best 
interests of the Possession and also in the best in-
terests of Queensland." 
When Byrnes died it was this Dickson, a moderate 
undistinguished figure in comparison, who became 
premier. With this support of Imperial control, he 
favoured ratifying the Ordinance, but did not want to 
lose political position in so doing. Therefore he tem-
porised, unable to take definite action untfl after the 
coming election, especially as some of his party were 
disaffected against him, and public opinion was still 
aroused against the syndicate. A frank Colonial Office 
opinion stated that "Mr. Dickson is too weak to do 
anything in which there is likely to be the least opposi-
tion, and it was madness of Lord Lamington to try and 
brace him up to disregard Sir George Turner, who is a 
pertinacious and combative little man, especially when 
he is on the winning side.''^^ 
Before the Queensland election could reveal the 
extent of Dickson's support, the three colonial pre-
miers firmly decided to compensate the Syndicate. 
Turner and Reid, still strongly opposed to any ap-
proval, overruled any compromise that Dickson could 
advocate. 
These expressions of opinion in the Queensland 
house and attempts to relate them to their background 
may seem inconclusive. Was there a more interested 
objection to the British New Guinea scheme in Queens-
land? One likely suggestion is opposition by Burns 
Philp who would probably object to operations by such 
a large syndicate, especiafly with the argument that it 
was to be granted a monopoly of the avaflable lands. 
As R. Philp was at this time in Byrnes' and Dickson's 
cabinets, his opposition may well have been behind 
Queensland's objections. There is no direct evidence at 
the time, that I have been able to uncover, to suggest 
this motive of opposition. 
25. J. Anderson 16/12/1898 on Lamington to C.O. 22/10/1898 (26845 C.O. 422/12). 
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There is, however, persuasive evidence in the 
events subsequent to the disallowing of the syndicate. 
For soon after the arrival of Lieutenant-Governor 
G. R. Le Hunte, a conference was held in Sydney (15th 
and 16th August 1899), to discuss the future land 
policy, and future financial backing of British New 
Guinea. On the second day G. R. Le Hunte reported: 
"he had just been waited on by Colonel Burns, the 
managing director of Burns Philp and Co., who had 
put into his hands a draft prospectus of a company 
with a capital of £100,000 to be formed for the develop-
ment of British New Guinea. The shares—100,000— 
would be in the first instance offered to the public of 
Australia, and if not taken up by them they would be 
taken up privately. It was intended to purchase 
100,000 acres of land for agricultural purposes, and 
100,000 acres of pasture lands."^^^ This was the Hall 
Sound Company, a subsidiary of Burns Philp, with 
practically the same directors, which was registered 
in New South Wales in 1900. Its failure due to N.S.W. 
opposition is another story, though it is significant 
here because of the usual rivalry between the firms 
of the different colonies, only a British firm could pro-
duce the uniformity of opposition shown in this British 
New Guinea Syndicate affair. 
Arguments against imputing Burns Philp in-
fluence affecting the Queensland opposition to the Syn-
dicate, lie in the lack of action before the Southern 
premiers sent protests. If you accept the argument 
that the matter was of some notoriety, and since yari-
ous people had been approached by Vine, and there 
had been a meeting in London, and further the Ordin-
ance had been openly passed in the New Guinea Coun-
cils, surely Burns Philp should have heard of the 
matter earlier. Further it can be argued that in the 
short term it was an advantage to Burns Philp to have 
more development, as it was primarily a trading firm. 
Further the directors of the Syndicate, insofar as they 
can be believed, claimed that they intended to use 
"existing agencies induding shinping firms, and to co-
operate with firms already trading in New Guinea."^^ 
Generally, even if there was this personal opposi-
tion of Burns Philp, and granted the opposition of 
26. Detail.x Sydney Conference 15-16/8/1899 '.see Lamington to C O . 30/9/1899 (31411 
C O . 422/14). 
27. From memo, in letter J. Lowles to the C O . 17/5/1897 (10568 C O . 422/11). 
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Bevan, and the representative of the Liverpool Syndi-
cate in the south, I think you need to add the opposi-
tion of Australians to a British firm to explain the 
nrotests. 
What were the effects on the New Guinea adminis-
tration of this Syndicate affair? 
The immediate effects were to place future land 
policy in particular, and afl financial support in general, 
in jeopardy. By October 1898 there was a "virtual 
deadlock existing in connection with the administra-
tion of the possession."28 The guaranteeing colonies, 
suspecting British policy, interpreted as granting con-
cessions to a British Company, refused to grant fur-
ther funds. Here then the coincidence of the Syndicate 
affair with the completion of the ten-year period meant 
immediate crises: thus, only for a brief three months' 
period would the colonies guarantee the petty salary 
for a medical officer for the Mambare (Gira) Goldfield; 
Turner even refused to grant money for the printing 
of Ordinances until some definite agreement was 
reached on the future control of the colony; the New 
Guinea Government steamer "Merrie England" was 
almost useless, due to lack of stores and a doubt about 
her future maintenance. These were the immediate 
problems, symptoms of the general debility of the 
colony caused by this dissension among the controlling 
bodies at this critical time when the previous agree-
ment expired and the term of Sir William Macgregor 
ended. 
The eventual effects of this abortive Syndicate 
scheme were generafly helpful to the administration 
of New Guinea. The unwelcome glare of publicity led 
to a strictly defined land policy that encouraged large-
scale settlement and interested various companies in 
investing in the Possession. The affair reasserted Aus-
tralian interest in New Guinea, it assured the fulfil-
ment of some agreement to provide for the finances, 
it assured, at least temporarily, the interest of the 
Southern governments in New Guinea n^atters. 
But the affair had shown lack of interest in New 
Guinea as anything but a paying colony, not once did 
future native policy gain consideration, and even Mac-
gregor claimed that his only policy had been to develop 
the colony qua colony. 
28. Dickson to Lamington 21/10/1898 in Lamington to C.O. 22/10/1898 (26796 C n 
422/12), and see Annual Reports to 6/1899. • 
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Thus the affair can be interpreted as marking the 
death knell of the spirit of the original Proclamation 
of the Protectorate, claiming the protection of the 
natives as the main objective of the new rulers, and 
as marking the end of Macgregor's experiment in 
Government, which although failing as a financial ven-
ture, had claimed to place native interests first. 
